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HOW AMERICAN WORKERS LOST THE 
RIGHT TO STRIKE, AND OTHER TALES 
James Gray Pope* 
To paraphrase a veteran labor scholar, if you want to know where 
the corpses are buried in labor law, look for the "of course" 
statements in court opinions.1 By "of course" statements, he meant 
propositions that are announced as if they were self-evident, requiring 
no justification. Each year, thousands of law students read such 
statements in labor law casebooks. And each year, they duly ask 
themselves - prodded sometimes by the casebook's notes - how 
these conclusions could be justified in legal terms. But often there 
seems to be no answer, and the mystery continues. 
This Essay recounts the origins of five such "of course" statements, 
each of which has had a devastating impact on the American labor 
movement. The five statements are: 
1) Of course, workers have no right of self-defense against 
employers that commit unfair labor practices.2 
2) Of course, employers enjoy the right to permanently 
replace economic strikers. 3 
3) Of course, the National Labor Relations Board has no 
power to deter unfair labor practices.4 
4) Of course, employers may exclude union organizers 
from their property.5 
5) Of course, employers may close operations out of 
* Professor of Law & Sidney Reitman Scholar, Rutgers University School of Law -
Newark. A.B. 1974, J.D. 1983, Harvard. Ph.D. (Politics) 2004, Princeton. - Ed. Funding for 
this Essay was provided by the Rutgers Law School Dean's Research Fund. The author is 
grateful to Jim Atleson, Marion Crain, Ellen Dannin, Cynthia Estlund, and Alan Hyde for 
their frank criticisms and helpful suggestions. 
1. JAMES 8. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN A MERICAN LABOR LAW 24 
(1983). 
2. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 257-58 (1939). See discussion 
infra Part I. 
3. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938). See discussion infra 
Part II. 
4 .  Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197,  235-36 (1938). See discussion infra Part 
III. 
5. NLRB v. Babcock and. Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 1 14 (1956); Lechmere, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 537 (1992). See discussion infra Part IV. 
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"spite" against workers who choose to unionize.6 
These statements all share one puzzling feature. In the accepted 
hierarchy of laws, only the United States Constitution can trump 
federal statutes.7 Yet each of these statements elevates the state 
common-law rights of employers over the federal statutory rights of 
workers.8 This strange phenomenon gives rise to a hypothesis: If the 
Constitution is the only source of law with sufficient authority to 
provide a legal justification for these "of course" statements, then 
maybe they can be traced to constitutional thinking. To give credit 
where credit is due, this is not my idea; it builds on an observation by 
then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist: 
From its earliest cases construing the National Labor Relations Act the 
Court has recognized the weight of an employer's property rights, rights 
which are explicitly protected from federal interference by the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution. The Court has not been quick to 
conclude in a given instance that Congress has authorized the displace­
ment of those rights by the federally created rights of the employees.9 
In support of this claim, Justice Rehnquist cited NLRB v. Fansteel 
Metallurgical Corporation,10 the source of our first "of course" 
statement. But he left the other cases unspecified. The five stories that 
follow (Parts I-V) confirm the accuracy of the Rehnquist thesis as 
applied to Fansteel, and suggest that - if we include liberty of contract 
and the Commerce Clause along with property rights - the other four 
"of course" statements can be explained as rooted in the Constitution 
as well. In each of the five cases, the Court revived Lochner-era 
doctrines - supposedly defunct since the "switch in time that saved 
nine" in 1937 - and applied them to cut back on statutory labor 
rights. Once again, judges have deprived workers of the rights to 
organize and strike, but this time without the forthright constitutional 
reasoning of the pre-1937 period. 
How did this happen? Why did the Court hide the constitutional 
ball in "of course" statements? What are the implications for labor law 
today? Part VI concludes the Essay by addressing those questions. 
6. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268-70 (1965). See 
discussion infra Part V. 
7. See Carlos E. Gonzalez, Popular Sovereign Generated Versus Government Institution 
Generated Constitutional Norms: When Does a Constitutional Amendment Not Amend the 
Constitution?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 127, 142-48 (2002) (analyzing in depth the operation of 
trumping norms in cases of legal conflict, including the trumping power of federal statutory 
law over state common law and of federal constitutional law over federal statutory law). 
8. These cases exemplify a general tendency of courts to privilege employer common 
law rights over worker statutory rights. On this tendency, see ATLESON, supra note 1, at 9-
10; Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern 
Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 293-97 (1978). 
9. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 580 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
10. 306 U.S. 240 (1939). 
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I. How AMERICAN WORKERS LOST THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE 
On February 17, 1937, members of the Steel Workers Organizing 
Committee at the Fansteel Metallurgical Corporation occupied two 
buildings of the factory and commenced a sit-down strike. That same 
day, management told the strikers that they were fired. 11 After a court 
enjoined the strikers to cease their occupation, a force of 140 police 
officers armed with tear gas guns and baseball bats assaulted the plant 
only to be repulsed by strikers hurling nuts, bolts, and other objects. A 
second attempt, conducted before dawn with a larger force, 
succeeded. During both attacks windows were broken and other 
company property damaged. After their eviction from the plant, a 
majority of the strikers were convicted of contempt of court and 
sentenced to fines and substantial jail terms.12 
The strikers claimed that they had rightfully occupied the factories 
in self-defense of their right to organize, protected under the recently 
enacted National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).1 3 Prior to the sit­
down, the corporation had committed a variety of unfair labor 
practices over a period of six months, including planting a spy in the 
local union, transferring the local's president to an isolated location, 
establishing a company-dominated union, and announcing that 
management would never bargain with the union under any 
circumstances.14 The workers had filed charges with the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB),15 but five months had gone by with 
no action. One union leader recalled: " [T)he members of the lodge felt 
that . . .  we were letting the company push us around, and we were not 
sticking up for their rights as they considered them under the Wagner 
labor law . . . .  [T)hey demanded we do something."16 Meanwhile, 
Fansteel's spy within the union was acting as an agent provocateur, 
urging the workers to go out on a traditional outside strike - thus 
giving the company an opportunity to break the union by bringing in 
striker replacements. 17 Caught between the necessity for action and 
11. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. 930, 942 (1938), enforcement denied, 98 
F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1938), rev'd in part, 306 U.S. 240 (1939). 
12 Id. at 942-43. 
13. See James Gray Pope, Worker Lawmaking, Sit-Down Strikes, and the Shaping of 
American Industrial Relations, 1935-1958 LAW & HISTORY (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript 
at 28-35). 
14. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. at 251-52; Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 5 
N.L.R.B. at 935. 
15. Record at 23-24, NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939) (No. 
436) [hereinafter Fansteel Record). 
16. Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Edward F. Prichard, Jr., The Fansteel Case: Employee 
Misconduct and the Remedial Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 52 HARV. L. 
REV. 1275, 1280-81 (1939). 
17. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. , 5 N.L.R.B. at 939; Fansteel Record, supra note 15, at 
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the perils of a traditional strike, the unionists resorted to the sit-down. 
The NLRB bypassed the workers' claim of self-defense by 
ordering Fansteel to reinstate the strikers as a remedy for the 
company's pre-strike unfair labor practices.18 The Supreme Court, on 
the other hand, squarely confronted the issue of whether the sit-down 
was protected under the NLRA. In an opinion by Chief Justice 
Hughes, the Court held that the Board could not reinstate sit-downers 
even though their strike would not have occurred but for the 
employer's violations of law. According to the Chief Justice, the 
strikers lost their status as statutory "employees" when Fansteel 
discharged them. And since the NLRB was empowered to reinstate 
only "employees," it could not reinstate the fired strikers.19 Why was it 
legal for Fansteel to terminate employees for responding with self­
help to its own statutory violations? The opinion made it clear that the 
employer's common-law property rights were of a different and higher 
order than the employees' statutory labor rights. While the company's 
repeated violations of the workers' right to organize did not deprive 
the company of "its legal rights to the possession and protection of its 
property," the workers' violation of the employer's property rights put 
them "outside the protection of the statute."20 At no point in his 
opinion for the majority did Chief Justice Hughes mention the impact 
of the employer's unfair labor practices on the workers' statutory 
rights. In fact, the Court was so little concerned about the 
corporation's violations that it referred to the sit-down as "an illegal 
seizure of the buildings in order to prevent their use by the employer 
in a lawful manner. "2 1 
How did the corporation's common law property rights rise so far 
above the workers' statutory rights? Constitutional law operated both 
to pump up the former and to deflate the latter. In NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin, the Court had upheld the Board's power to reinstate a 
worker fired for union activity, but only because the Act allowed the 
employer to fire a worker for any other reason, and thus did "not 
389, 394-95; Hart & Prichard, supra note 16, at 1280-81. At the time of the Fanstee/ strike, 
the Board had already developed the rule that workers who struck in protest of unfair labor 
practices could not be permanently replaced. Carlisle Lumber Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 248 (1936), 
enforced as modified, 94 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 575 (1938); Jefferey­
De Witt Insulator Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 618 (1936), enforced, 91 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1937), cert. 
denied, 302 U.S. 731 (1937). But relying on this rule would do nothing to protect the workers 
or their union during the period that unfair labor practice charges were pending - a period 
that, judging from the five-month delay that had already ensued since the union filed its 
charges, would be a long one. 
18. The Board reasoned that reinstatement was necessary to restore the status quo 
prevailing prior to the employer's violations. Fanstee/ Metallurgic Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. at 949-
50. 
19. Fansteel Metallurgic Corp., 306 U.S. at 252-53, 255. 
20. Id. at 253, 256-57. 
21. Id. at 256 (emphasis added). 
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interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the employer to 
select its employees or to discharge them."22 In Fansteel, Chief Justice 
Hughes characterized the issue as whether the Act abrogated the 
employer's right to fire workers who had illegally seized its property 
- certainly a "normal" exercise of the right to discharge.2 3 "Apart 
from the question of the constitutional validity of an enactment of that 
sort," he wrote, "it is enough to say that such a legislative intention 
should be found in some definite and unmistakable expression."24 The 
Chief Justice did not cite any authority for the existence of a 
constitutional right to discharge workers, a gap that was filled in 
Fansteel's brief with citations to the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and to the Lochner-era cases of Adair v. United States 
and Coppage v. Kansas.25 Thus, in both Jones & Laughlin and Fansteel, 
the Court affirmed that employers continued to enjoy a constitutional 
right to discharge workers under the due process clause. 
While the employer's right to fire workers rose to the 
constitutional level, the workers' statutory right to organize all but 
disappeared from consideration. This too had its roots in 
constitutional thinking, here grounded on the Commerce Clause. In 
Jones & Laughlin, the Court had held that a Board order could 
survive constitutional challenge only if the particular unfair labor 
practices at issue actually affected interstate commerce and thus fell 
within Congress's commerce power.2 6 NLRB General Counsel Charles 
Fahy interpreted this to mean that the reach of the Act to a particular 
enterprise hinged on whether "stoppage of . . .  operations by industrial 
strife" in that enterprise would substantially interrupt or interfere with 
interstate commerce.27 In its anxiousness to win this point, the Board 
focused solely on the commerce-protecting purpose of the Act, which 
tended to cast unions and strikers as dangerous disruptors of 
commerce. Forgotten were other NLRA policies that might have 
22. 301 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1937). 
23. Fansteel Metallurgic Corp., 306 U.S. at 252. 
24. Id. at 255. Justice Stone's concurrence took a similar approach, observing that if the 
Act had expressed an intention to bar employers from discharging workers for "unlawful 
practices," he "should have thought it of sufficiently dubious constitutionality to require us 
to construe its language otherwise, if that could reasonably be done . . . .  " Id. at 265 (Stone, 
J., concurring). 
25. Brief for Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. at 33, NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 
306 U.S. 240 (1938) (No. 436) (citing Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (striking 
down federal statutory prohibition on yellow dog contracts, partly on 5th amendment due 
process grounds), and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating state statutory 
prohibition on yellow dog contracts as a violation of the due process clause of the 14th 
amendment)). 
26. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 30-31 (citing National Labor Relations Act § lO(a), 29 
U.S.C. § 160(a) (2000)). 
27. See Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 83 L. Ed. 126, 132 (1938) (Lawyers' Edition 
summary of Fahy's argument). 
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offered stronger support for the Board's orders - policies like 
"restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and 
employees," "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective 
bargaining," and "protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom 
of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of 
their own choosing. "28 
The Court went a step further. Not only did the Justices follow the 
Board in skipping over these policies and focusing solely on protecting 
commerce, but they also substituted their own judgment for that of 
Congress as to how commerce would best be protected. Section 1 of 
the Act declared that it was "the policy of the United States to 
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow 
of commerce . . .  by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom 
of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of 
their own choosing . . . .  "29 The causes to be eliminated were the 
"denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and 
the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective 
bargaining." 30 In this light, it seems clear that - whatever else they 
were doing - the Fansteel strikers were serving the primary purpose 
of the Act by enforcing its guarantee of the right to organize and 
thereby helping to "eliminate the causes" of strikes. The NLRB had 
failed to take action on their unfair labor practice charge, filed five 
months before the sit-down, and their union was threatened with 
destruction due to the employer's violations. An outside strike would 
have exposed the workers to replacement, a danger underscored by 
the fact that the company's spy in the union was urging that course of 
action. 31 Only by sitting down could the workers prevent the employer 
from reaping the benefits of its violations. 
To the Court, however, the need for a prompt remedy did not 
register in the balance. Chief Justice Hughes declined to consider 
whether the workers' mode of enforcement was necessary or effective, 
but considered only whether it was peaceful. Since the sit-down strike 
involved "force and violence in defiance of the law of the land," it 
clearly did not promote industrial peace. 32 The procedures of the Act, 
on the other hand, were "peaceful." The Court did not pause to 
consider whether the Board's peaceful processes could, as a practical 
matter, remedy the employer's destruction of the union's majority 
support. Thus, the statutory strategy of eliminating the causes of 
28. National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000). 
29. Id. (emphasis added). 
30. Id. 
31. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. 930, 939 (1938); Hart & Prichard, supra 
note 16, at 1280-81. 
32. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgic Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 258 (1939). 
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disruptions to commerce fell out of the equation.33 
The Court's lack of concern for the workers' statutory rights 
cannot be blamed entirely on Chief Justice Hughes or the Fansteel 
majority. The statute itself reduced the workers' rights to the status of 
mere means to the end of preventing disruptions to commerce. This 
was the result of a conscious choice by the bill's creator, Senator 
Robert Wagner of New York. Labor leaders and others had urged the 
Senator to ground his bill not on Congress's commerce power but on 
its human rights powers. To Andrew Furuseth, the labor movement's 
leading constitutional thinker, the bill exemplified the "Christian 
principle of evolution from slavery to freedom," which belonged 
under the Thirteenth Amendment, not the Commerce Clause.34 
Philosophically, Senator Wagner took a similar view of his bill. Along 
with other proponents of the NLRA, he likened the non-union 
workplace to feudalism and slavery, and he promised that government 
enforcement of the right to organize would bestow upon workers 
"emancipation from economic slavery and . . .  an opportunity to walk 
the streets free men in fact as well as in name. "35 
But Senator Wagner adhered to the commerce power as a 
constitutional justification, apparently in the belief that it was more 
acceptable to middle-class reformers and judges.3 6 As a result, each 
exercise of the NLRB 's authority had to be justified not in terms of 
labor freedom, but as an effort to prevent disruptions to commerce. 
During the early, formative period of NLRA jurisprudence, this 
constitutional requirement shaped the developing interpretation of the 
statute. Even the Board's own lawyers defended the Act as an exercise 
of Congress's power to "control" and "punish" strikes under Lochner­
era precedents.37 In its Fansteel opinion, as we have seen, the Board 
33. Hart & Prichard, supra note 16, at 1321-22. 
34. Letter from Andrew Furuseth, President, International Seamen's Union, to Senator 
Robert F. Wagner (Apr. 16, 1935), in Robert F. Wagner Papers, Labor Series, box 4, folder 
39, Georgetown Univ. Special Collections; see also James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth 
Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American 
Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14, 54-55 (2002) [hereinafter Pope, 
Thirteenth Amendment] (reporting the American Federation of Labor's proposal to ground 
the bill on the Republican Government Clause of Article IV, and others' advocacy of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
35. 79 CONG. REC. 6184 (1935) (address by Senator Wagner), reprinted in 2 NLRB, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 2284 (1949) 
[hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] ; see also To Create a National Labor Board: Hearings 
on S. 2926 Before the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 73 Cong. 467-68 (1934) (statement of Guy 
L. Harrington), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 501-02 (quoting Senator 
Wagner's insistence that "all [the bill] does is to make the worker a free man"). For other 
quotations, see Pope, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 34, at 47-50. 
36. See Pope, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 34, at 55-56. 
37. See ARGUMENTS IN THE CASES ARISING UNDER THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT AND 
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STA TES, S. Doc. No. 75-52, at 124, 171 (1937); Pope, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 34, 
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focused solely on the protection of commerce, failing even to mention 
the express statutory policies in favor of equal bargaining power, 
freedom of association, or collective bargaining. In hindsight, it seems 
inevitable that courts would be tempted to bypass those policies 
and directly discourage workers from striking, thereby protecting 
commerce. 
Senator Wagner foresaw this possibility and inserted language to 
prevent it. Section 13 provided that "[n]othing in this Act shall be 
construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the 
right to strike. "38 The Senator explained that the Act was designed "to 
reduce the number of strikes by eliminating the main wrongs and 
injustices that cause strikes." Accordingly, the "imposition of legal 
restrictions upon the right to strike, instead of removing these wrongs, 
would merely deprive the worker of his inalienable right to protest 
against them. "39 
But Fansteel demonstrated the inadequacy of section 1 3  as a 
control on judges. Chief Justice Hughes easily dismissed the strikers' 
section 13 argument on the ground that "the right to strike" encom­
passed only "the unquestioned right to quit work."40 Senator Wagner's 
broader view of section 1 3  ("I would not buy peace," he said, "at the 
price of slavery"41 ) dropped out. The Court did not even consider the 
price of peace in Fansteel. And the peace that followed its decision was 
one of unbridled employer domination. By barring the Board from 
reinstating the strikers, the Court left Fansteel with a workforce 
composed of striker replacements and workers who had crossed the 
union's picket lines. This workforce rejected the Steel Workers 
Organizing Committee and voted to be represented by an in-house 
union, which Fansteel promptly recognized as the exclusive represen­
tative for all its production employees.42 This "union" negotiated a 
grievance procedure culminating in a final decision not by an impartial 
arbitrator, but by Fansteel's President, R.J. Aitchison. In April of 
1939, Aitchison looked back with satisfaction on the course of events. 
Relations with the employees were "closer than ever before" - so 
close that not a single grievance had been filed under the new 
at 81-82. 
38. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 13, 49 Stat. 449, 457 (1935). 
39. National Labor Relations Act and Proposed Amendments: Hearings Before the S. 
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 76th Cong. 17 (1939) (statement of Senator Robert F. Wagner) 
(quoted in Leon H. Keyserling, Why the Wagner Act?, in THE WAGNER ACT: AFrER TEN 
YEARS 31 (Louis G. Silverberg ed., 1945)). 
40. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 256 (1939). 
41. 78 CONG. REC. 12044 (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 35, 
at 1241. 
42. H. E. Fleming, In the Wake of a Sit-down Strike, 46 CHEMICAL & METALLURGICAL 
ENGINEERING 624, 625 (1939). 
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procedure.4 3 "You could either be embittered or liberalized by an 
experience like ours," he observed. "I think I have been liberalized."44 
In what did this liberalization consist? Not in any regret for the 
company's unfair labor practices, but in "explaining more to the 
employees and in giving more attention to employee relations."45 
Not only did Aitchison enjoy the new docility of his workforce, but 
he also received a raft of "fan mail" from other employers congratu­
lating the company on its historic victory.46 Just how historic became 
increasingly apparent over time. The courts and, eventually, the 
NLRB read Fansteel broadly to authorize the discharge of workers for 
engaging in slow-downs and other partial strike activities.47 More 
recently, the Supreme Court relied on Fansteel to support its decision 
in Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, denying backpay to 
undocumented aliens who had been fired for joining a labor union.48 
In Hoffman, as in Fansteel, both the workers and the company had 
violated the law. And as in Fansteel, the Court held that the workers' 
violations deprived them of their remedy for the employer's 
violations. Thus, the workers suffered not only the legal penalties for 
their lawbreaking - imprisonment and fines in Fansteel, deportation 
in Hoffman - but also the disruption of their unions and the loss of 
jobs and pay. By contrast, the employers in both cases enjoyed the 
benefits of their lawbreaking, unimpeded by any sanction other than 
an order to post notices promising to refrain from future violations -
notices that might as well have bragged: "Look what we got away 
with." Hoffman has effectively created "an underclass of low-wage 
Latino immigrants" whose legal status resembles that of slavery or 
involuntary servitude in its denial of any effective remedy for 
violations of worker rights.49 
43. Id. at 627. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 627. 
46. Id. 
47. Craig Becker, "Better Than a Strike": Protecting New Forms of Collective Work 
Stoppages under the National Labor Relations Act, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 368-69 nn.77 & 83 
(1994). 
48. 535 U.S. 137, 142-43 (2002) (citing Fansteel as an instance in which awards of 
reinstatement and backpay were rightly set aside because of serious employee misconduct).  
49. Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Borderline Decisions: Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, the New Bracero Program, and the Supreme Court's Role in Making Federal 
Labor Policy, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (2003); Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an 
Interconnected World: Going Beyond the Dichotomies of Domestic Immigration and Labor 
Laws, 36 U. MICH. J L. REFORM 737, 754-55 (2003); Maria L. Ontiveros, Immigrant 
Workers' Rights in a Post-Hoffman World B Organizing around the Thineenth Amendment 
(forthcoming). 
December 2004) How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike 
II. How AMERICAN WORKERS LOST THE RIGHT TO STRIKE 
527 
In NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., the Supreme Court 
laid down a dictum that has puzzled legal scholars and vexed unions 
increasingly over the years. so According to this dictum, an employer 
enjoys the right permanently to replace workers who strike for better 
wages and conditions. The dictum is puzzling because the strike is one 
of those "concerted activities" protected under section 7, and 
employers are prohibited from discharging or otherwise interfering 
with, restraining, coercing or discriminating against employees for 
exercising section 7 rights. s1 Yet the Mackay Court simply asserted the 
employer right, offering no explanation why strikers - who are 
admittedly protected against "discharge" - can nevertheless be 
replaced permanently at the discretion of the employer. 
The employer's right to hire permanent replacements operates as 
an unqualified trump over the section 7 right to strike for better 
conditions and higher wages. The employer need not show any 
business reason for its exercise (for example, that unless replacements 
are offered permanent employment the company will be unable to 
continue operating) ,  and the rule leaves no room for the Board to 
argue that the impact of permanent replacement on the section 7 right 
outweighs the employer's interest. s2 Theoretically, an employer 
violates the Act if it replaces strikers for reasons of anti-union animus. 
But because animus is virtually impossible to prove (unless the 
employer is clumsy enough to reveal it in public), the law does nothing 
to prevent an employer from seizing on the strike as an opportunity to 
replace union with nonunion workers. s3 In effect, when workers go out 
on strike, they give the employer a license to discriminate; the 
employer need only limit itself to (1) "permanently replacing" union 
workers as opposed to "discharging" them, and (2) discriminating only 
between strikebreakers and strikers as opposed to discriminating 
among loyal strikers (as on the facts of Mackay, where the employer 
targeted active unionists for replacement) or among strikebreakers. 
The result is a bizarre reversal of the strike's traditional function. 
50. 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938). 
51. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(l), (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l), (3) (2000); see 
Eileen Silverstein, If You Can't Beat 'em, Learn to Lose, but Never Join Them, 30 CONN. L. 
REV. 1371, 1373 (1998) ("As an exercise in statutory interpretation, even the most 
conservative students have wondered at a result that honors, on the one hand, the 
prohibition against discharging employees because they strike, but allows, on the other hand, 
replacement of strikers and retention of strikebreakers once the dispute has ended."). 
52 See JULIUS G. GETMAN ET AL., LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND THE LAW 
164 (2d ed. 1999); ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 329 (1976). 
53. GETMAN ET AL., supra note 52, at 163; George Schatzki, Some Observations and 
Suggestions Concerning a Misnomer - "Protected" Concerted Activities, 47 TEX. L. REV. 
378, 383 (1969). 
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Although the strike is legally protected so that it can provide workers 
with a source of bargaining power, it now serves as a source of 
employer bargaining power. According to a recent study of collective 
bargaining negotiations, employers are now more likely to threaten 
permanent replacement than unions are to threaten a strike.54 As 
Cynthia Estlund recently put it, the Mackay dictum has "rendered the 
strike useless and virtually suicidal for many employees, and has 
become employers' Exhibit Number One in union organizing 
campaigns. "55 As employers have turned increasingly to permanent 
replacements, the incidence of strikes has dropped sharply.56 That the 
labor movement considers the Mackay dictum to be a serious problem 
is evidenced by the fact that in 1996, at a time when the Presidency 
and both houses of Congress were held by Democrats, the AFL-CIO 
launched an intense campaign for legislation to overturn it - only to 
see the bill succumb twice to Senate filibusters.57 
The Mackay Court cited no source and offered no reasoning to 
support the existence of an employer right permanently to replace 
strikers.58 The statutory language, which makes it an unfair labor 
practice for the employer to engage in "discrimination" based on 
union activity or to "coerce" employees in the exercise of their section 
7 rights, appears to negate any such right.59 An employer that retains 
nonstriking workers at the end of a strike while denying returning 
strikers their jobs is certainly discriminating - in the ordinary 
meaning of the word - based on union activity.60 Workers who cross 
54. See Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, The Social Contract at the Bargaining Table: Evidence 
from a National Survey of Labor and Management Negotiators, in 2 INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION SERIES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 51ST ANNUAL 
MEETING 214, 216-19 (Paula B. Voos ed., 1999). 
55. JULIUS GETMAN, THE BETRAYAL OF LOCAL 14, at 224-28 (1998); WILLIAM B. 
GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM 185-88, 202-03 (1993); PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING 
THE WORKPLACE: THE FuTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 264-69 (1990); Cynthia 
L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1538 (2002) 
(hereinafter Estlund, Ossification] (citing CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE? 29, 
132-34, 143-46 (1993); Michael H. Gottesman, Union Summer: A Reawakened Interest in the 
Law of Labor?, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 285, 293-96 (1996); James J. Brudney, To Strike or Not 
to Strike, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 65, 71-72, 80-81 (1999) (book review)). 
56. Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical 
Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 440-41 (2002). 
57. Estlund, Ossification, supra note 55, at 1541. 
58. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. , 304 U.S. at 345-46. 
59. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(l), (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l), (3) (2000). 
60. See ATLESON, supra note 1, at 24-25; GORMAN, supra note 52, at 329. Employers 
sometimes argue that there are no positions for the returning strikers because the 
replacements are in current possession. However, the strikers were in possession prior to the 
strike, and section 2(3) of the Act specifies that "any individual whose work has ceased as a 
consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair 
labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent 
employment" remains an "employee." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). 
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picket lines are rewarded with permanent jobs, while workers who 
exercise their statutory right to strike are punished with the loss of 
their jobs. And there are few more potent forms of coercion than 
forcing individual workers to choose between a protected activity and 
losing their jobs to permanent replacements. Whether the loss of a job 
comes as a result of a discharge (concededly illegal) or of "permanent 
replacement," it certainly constitutes a powerful disincentive to 
engage in protected activity. Furthermore, at the time of Mackay, 
section 13 of the Act barred courts not only from construing the Act to 
impose direct legal restraints on the right to strike, but also from 
reading it to "interfere with or impede or diminish" the right "in any 
way."61 
Commentators have tried to fit the Mackay dictum into the 
structure of current law by asserting that it rests on the assumption 
that employers have a legitimate business need to offer prospective 
replacements permanent employment in order to operate during 
strikes.62 But the Court never made any such determination, and there 
is nothing in the opinion to indicate that the Justices were thinking 
along those lines. If they were, then they were simply wrong on the 
facts. Employers routinely succeed in obtaining striker replacements 
without offering permanent employment, and there is no evidence 
that they need to make such offers.63 Moreover, the Mackay dictum 
would not fit into the structure of current law even if employers could 
show that they were motivated by a desire to attract replacement 
workers. Under the current standard, which outlaws employer 
countermeasures that are "inherently destructive" of section 7 rights 
even if the employer acted out of legitimate business reasons, the 
hiring of permanent replacement workers would seem to be inherently 
destructive just as discharge is inherently destructive.64 In short, the 
Mackay dictum cannot be explained or rationalized with reference to 
the employer's need to hire striker replacements. 
Looking at the paper trail leading up to the dictum, we find that 
the issue was treated not as a question of the employer's business 
necessity, but rather as a matter of constitutional law. As in Fansteel, 
the employer claimed constitutional protection for its freedom to 
terminate strikers, and argued that termination would promote the 
statute's constitutional purpose of preventing disruptions to interstate 
61. National Labor Relations Act, § 13, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935) (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169). 
62. See GETMAN ET AL., supra note 52, at 164; GORMAN, supra note 52, at 329. 
63. See Hal Keith Gillespie, The Mackay Doctrine and the Myth of Business Necessity, 
50 TEX. L. REV. 782, 788-95 (1972); Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of 
Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 391 (1984). 
64. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33 (1967); ATLESON, supra note 1, 
at 27-28. 
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commerce. Mackay Company lawyers contended that a Board order 
reinstating economic strikers would deprive the employer of its 
property and liberty guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. As long as 
the employer had not provoked the strike by unfair labor practices, its 
"ordinary right" to select its employees remained "invulnerable." 
And, although strikers technically remained employees, they had no 
current contractual relation with their employer. Thus, concluded 
Mackay's lawyers, a Board order reinstating strikers would, in effect, 
force the employer to enter into a new contract with the strikers - a 
clear violation of the Fifth Amendment.65 In addition, the company's 
lawyers argued that strikers should be faced with the possibility of 
losing their jobs permanently, because that threat would discourage 
them from striking, thus promoting the statutory policy of preventing 
disruptions to interstate commerce.66 The Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit twice ruled for the employer, with Judge Curtis Wilbur 
writing two lead opinions adopting Mackay's Fifth Amendment theory 
- one before Jones & L aughlin and one afterward, on rehearing.67 
While Mackay's lawyers and Judge Wilbur elevated the employer's 
rights to the constitutional level, the NLRB subsumed the workers' 
rights into the Act's constitutional purpose of preventing disruptions 
to interstate commerce. Employer interference with union activity 
tended to provoke strikes, reasoned the Board, and strikes injured 
commerce - as illustrated by the Mackay strike itself, which 
drastically reduced the company's communications traffic and resulted 
in considerable loss of business. 68 This argument fit right in with the 
constitutional theory embraced by the Supreme Court in Jones & 
Laughlin and its companion cases, but it also portrayed the strikers' 
legally protected activity as a kind of economic vandalism. It 
dovetailed with the employer's argument that to grant the Board 
power to reinstate strikers "would thwart rather than accomplish" the 
Act's purposes because, " [b]y guaranteeing a striker his job, . . .  
peaceful negotiation would be discouraged and strikes would be 
65. Brief for Respondent at 30, 40-41, NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 
(1938) (No. 37-706) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent Mackay]. 
66. Id. at 26. 
67. Judge Wilbur's first opinion construed the statute to grant the power to reinstate 
economic strikers and then declared it unconstitutional on Fifth Amendment grounds, citing 
such economic due process cases as Adair, Coppage, and Lochner. NLRB v. Mackay Radio 
& Tel. Co., 87 F.2d 611, 615-18 (9th Cir. 1937), rev'd 304 U.S. 333 (1938), remanded to 92 
F.2d 761, 764-65 (9th Cir. 1937). The judge's second opinion applied the clear statement rule 
to find that the statute - "properly construed in the light of the Constitution" - did not 
empower the Board to reinstate economic strikers. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 92 
F.2d 761, 765 (9th Cir. 1937). On both occasions, a second judge concurred on 
nonconstitutional grounds while a third dissented. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 87 F.2d at 631, 
632; Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. , 92 F.2d at 765. 
68. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 201, 231 (1936), enforcement denied, 87 F.2d 
611 (9th Cir. 1937), rev'd 304 U.S. 333 (1938). 
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encouraged. "69 The Board made no mention of the statutory policies 
in favor of equal bargaining power or full freedom of association. Nor 
did it make any mention of section 13, which had been inserted into 
the Act precisely to ensure that the right to strike would not be 
suppressed as a means of obtaining industrial peace.70 
As to the specific issue of permanent replacement, the Board 
based its original finding of a violation not on the company's refusal to 
reinstate economic strikers per se, but on its discrimination among 
returning strikers in selecting who would fill the positions that were 
available at the end of the strike. The opinion explained that the 
employer had illegally refused to reinstate union officers and activists 
while, at the same time, reinstating less active strikers. The Board 
declined to address the broader question of the employer's right to 
retain replacement workers in preference to economic strikers 
because "a decision on the point is not necessary to the final 
judgment. "71 But in the Supreme Court, the Board's General Counsel, 
Charles Fahy, conceded that an employer could replace strikers and 
then, at the conclusion of the strike, retain the replacements and 
refuse to reinstate the would-be returning strikers.72 
Scholars have wondered why Fahy made this apparently gratuitous 
concession. From a constitutional perspective, however, it does not 
appear gratuitous. Throughout the litigation, Mackay's lawyers and 
the Court of Appeals majority had insisted that the Board was seeking 
a general power to reinstate economic strikers at the end of the strike. 
In the Court of Appeals' first decision, Judge Wilbur's lead opinion 
went so far as to claim that the Board had relied "solely" on the broad 
contention that it was unlawful for the employer to refuse to reinstate 
economic strikers.73 From the Board's point of view, this was nothing 
more than an obfuscation; the Board had claimed only the limited 
power to remedy discrimination among the strikers. But from the 
point of view of the employer and the Court of Appeals majority, 
whose approach to the case centered on preserving the employer's 
"normal" Fifth Amendment right to select its employees, this was a 
distinction without a difference. Either way, the employer would be 
forced to make new contracts with strikers who had - voluntarily and 
unprovoked by any employer unfair labor practices - terminated 
their previous contractual relations by going on strike.74 
69. Brief for Respondent Mackay, supra note 65, at 27. 
70. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. 
71. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. , 1 N.L.R.B. at 218. 
72. Reply Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 15-17, NLRB v. Mackay 
Radio & Tel. Co. ,  304 U.S. 333 (1938) (No. 37-706) [hereinafter NLRB Reply Brief]. 
73. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 87 F.2d at 628. 
74. See Brief for Respondent Mackay, supra note 65, at 31-33. 
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At first, Fahy responded to this problem by trying to clarify the 
Board's position. In June 1937, he urged his regional lawyers to 
explain on rehearing that the Board's order hinged not on 
discrimination against strikers generally, but on discrimination for 
union membership and leadership among the returning strikers.75 At 
this point, there was no talk of any concession; Fahy continued to 
follow the Board's original approach of distinguishing - without 
conceding - the permanent replacement issue. But the Court of 
Appeals again conflated the issues and accepted Mackay's economic 
due process argument.76 Fahy responded by attempting once more to 
explain without making any concession, this time in the Board's initial 
brief to the Supreme Court.77 But Mackay's lawyers ignored this 
explanation and insisted yet again that the Board was claiming a 
general power to reinstate economic strikers in preference to 
replacement workers - a power "so obnoxious to the basic principles 
of our Bill of Rights that it cannot stand."78 It was at this point, in the 
Board's reply brief, that Fahy made his fateful concession as part of a 
seven-page discourse explaining, from every possible angle, that the 
company's argument rested on a "gross misstatement of the Board's 
position."79 
Of course, we can never know for certain the reason for Fahy's 
decision.80 Nevertheless, the available evidence suggests that he was 
75. Fahy suggested that "it would be wise to refute the statement in Judge Wilbur's 
opinion that the Board predicated its conclusion of discrimination 'upon the inference 
arising from the refusal of the respondent to reemploy these individuals solely from the fact 
that they were union employees who had been engaged actively in an unsuccessful strike and 
who desired and were refused reemployment,"' and pointed out the fact that the strikers 
denied reinstatement "were the most active union officers or strike leaders." Memorandum 
from Charles Fahy to A. Norman Somers, NLRB 20th Region, June 4, 1937, NLRB Records 
(RG 25), Entry 155, Box 860, at 1 .  
76. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 92 F.2d 761, 763-65 (9th Cir. 1937). 
77. Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 35-37, NLRB v. Mackay Radio & 
Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (No. 706). 
78. Brief for Respondent Mackay, supra note 65, at 49-50. 
79. NLRB Reply Brief, supra note 72, at 15-17. 
80. Fahy's own explanation does not provide significant evidence for or against the 
account given here. Fahy tried to persuade the Court that the Board had already decided, 
prior to the Mackay reply brief, that the employer enjoyed a right to hire permanent 
replacements. NLRB Reply Brief, supra note 72, at 16. In support of this claim, the brief 
cited three decisions: Black Diamond S.S. Corp., 3 N.L.R.B. 84 (1937), enforced, 94 F.2d 875 
(2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 579 (1938); Carlisle Lumber Co. ,  2 N.L.R.B. 248 (1936), 
enforced as modified, 94 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 575 (1938); and 
Jefferey-DeWitt Insulator Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 618 (1936), enforced, 91 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1937), 
cert. denied, 302 U.S. 731 (1937). In each of these cases, the Board reinstated unfair labor 
practice strikers using language implying that the employer's provocation or prolongation of 
the strike by unfair labor practices was important to the outcome. See Black Diamond S.S. 
Corp. , 3 N.L.R.B. at 93; Carlisle Lumber Co., 2 N.L.R.B. at 277; Jefferey-DeWitt Insulator 
Co., 1 N.L.R.B. at 626-27. It does not appear, however, that the issue of the rights of 
economic strikers was raised in any of these cases. By contrast, the issue was noted, 
distinguished, and expressly left open in the Board's Mackay opinion. 1 N.L.R.B. at 216. 
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attempting to accomplish by concession what the NLRB lawyers had 
repeatedly failed to accomplish by explanation - namely, assuaging 
fears that a holding for the Board in Mackay would effectively 
empower it to compel employers to rehire all economic strikers. This 
fear had already led to two Court of Appeals decisions applying the 
Fifth Amendment to negate any Board power to reinstate strikers, 
whether or not there had been discrimination among the strikers. But 
if the Board could not convince skeptics of its narrow intentions, it 
could outright negate any possible fears as to the broad issue by 
conceding that issue in no uncertain terms. To pay for this negation, 
the Board would give up only the dubious privilege of trying to defend 
a general Board power to reinstate strikers against constitutional 
challenges. Evidence that this would be a difficult task came not only 
from conservative judicial activists like Judge Wilbur, but also from 
proponents of deference like Augustus and Learned Hand. Two 
months before Fahy made his concession, a panel of the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals that included both Hands upheld a Board 
order reinstating unfair labor practice strikers against due process 
attack on grounds that implied economic strikers would not have 
prevailed. " [N]o more is done," reasoned the court, "than to maintain 
the status quo which existed on December 14, 1936, as against unfair 
labor practices which occurred thereafter."81 The panel's use of this 
rationale implied that if the strike had not been triggered by the 
employer's unfair labor practices, the employer would have continued 
to enjoy its constitutional right to select its employees. In short, it 
seems likely that Fahy traded the permanent replacement issue for a 
favorable holding on the constitutional objection to the reinstatement 
order in Mackay. 
At first, the Mackay dictum had little impact on the ground. 
Strikers used mass picket lines to block even temporary replacements. 
Employers called on police to open the lines, but unions insisted that 
police action against "peaceful" mass picket lines amounted to 
partisan intervention in violation of the right to strike. During the 
great post-war strike wave of 1946 and 1947, the big industrial unions 
of the CIO called mass demonstrations and mobilized political 
pressure to keep the police "neutral" in labor disputes. In Rochester, 
New York; Lancaster, Pennsylvania; Stamford, Connecticut; and 
Oakland, California, workers staged city-wide general strikes to 
protest police attacks on mass picket lines.82 Most unionized 
employers soon gave up the idea of trying to operate with replacement 
workers. While the official law continued to grant employers the right 
81. Black Diamond S.S. Corp., 94 F.2d at 879. 
82. See GEORGE LIPSITZ, CLASS AND CULTURE IN COLD WAR AMERICA 130-42 
(1981); ART PREIS, LABOR'S GIANT STEP: TwENTY YEARS OF THE CIO: 1936-55, at 267-72, 
276-78 (1972). 
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to operate during strikes, an unofficial norm barred them from doing 
so. Writing in 1956, Jack Barbash described the "prevailing situation" 
in the United States: "[T]he employer . . .  makes no attempt to operate 
the plant during the strike and the picket line becomes only the 
symbolic expression of the strike."83 
By the early 1960s, however, a new generation of managers had 
begun to replace those who had experienced the mass picket lines of 
the 1940s. Meanwhile, labor leaders had come to rely less on solidarity 
and strike action than on government processes and employer 
goodwill. When the new managers challenged the old norm, they were 
pleasantly surprised to discover that labor's tradition of solidarity had 
atrophied to the point that many workers were happy to cross picket 
lines. By the mid-1980s, the Mackay rule had become fully effective on 
the ground, and striking was no longer a viable option for most 
workers.84 
III. How THE N A TIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD LOST ITS 
TEETH 
The Supreme Court has ruled that the NLRB cannot act to deter 
unfair labor practices, but must limit itself to remedying harms 
inflicted by parties before the Board.85 As a result, employers have 
little incentive to comply with the law. From a cost-benefit point of 
view, it is often profitable to fire union advocates. If the employer can 
avoid even a modest wage increase, the savings are likely to exceed 
many times over the costs of any back-pay awards that the Board 
might eventually assess.86 It is not surprising, then, that employers fire 
or otherwise retaliate against one out of every eighteen private-sector 
workers who support a union organizing campaign.87 In the late 1970s, 
the labor movement and its allies waged a major campaign for 
legislation to authorize penalties, but the resulting Labor Law Reform 
83. JACK BARBASH, THE PRACTICE OF UNIONISM 227 (1956); see also LABOR STUDY 
GROUP, THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 88 (1961). 
84. See LEON FINK, IN SEARCH OF THE WORKING CLASS 161-62 (1994); CHARLES R. 
PERRY ET AL., OPERATING DURING STRIKES: COMPANY EXPERIENCE, NLRB POLICIES, 
AND GOVERNMENTAL REGULATIONS 39-40 (1982); see also supra notes 54-57 and 
accompanying text. 
85. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 9-10 (1940); GETMAN ET AL., supra note 
52, at 88-89. 
86. See Morris M. Kleiner, What Will it Take? Establishing the Economic Costs to 
Management of Noncompliance with the NLRA, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF 
AMERICAN LABOR LAW 137, 140-46 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1994); Paul Weiler, 
Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1787-1803 (1983). 
87. See Charles J. Morris, A Tale of Two Statutes: Discrimination for Union Activity 
Under the NLRA and RLA, 2 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 317, 330 (1998) (study based 
on NLRB records). 
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Bill of 1977-1978 fell victim to a Senate filibuster.88 
The prohibition on Board deterrence has its origins in the Supreme 
Court's 1938 decision in Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB.89 There, 
the Court announced that the Board's power to remedy unfair labor 
practices was "remedial, not punitive" and that it must be exercised as 
"a means of removing or avoiding the consequences of violation" -
not as a means of deterring the violations themselves - and even 
then, only "where those consequences are of a kind to thwart the 
purposes of the Act."90 As in Mackay, the Court offered no 
explanation for its conclusion. Chief Justice Hughes forthrightly 
depicted it as a matter of opinion: 
We think that [the statutory] authority to order affirmative action does 
not go so far as to confer a punitive jurisdiction enabling the Board to 
inflict upon the employer any penalty it may choose because he is 
engaged in unfair labor practices, even though the Board be of the 
opinion that the policies of the Act might be effectuated by such an 
order.91 
The Court's prohibition on deterrence finds scant support in the 
statutory language, which authorizes the Board to order violators "to 
cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such 
affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or 
without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this [Act]."92 The 
very breadth of this language poses a problem for interpretation. 
During the legislative hearings, one witness described it as "the 
provision that . . .  you may require them to do anything else that you 
want them to do that you think is in accordance with the purpose of 
the act" and complained that it was "so vague and indefinite that, 
judging by previous court decisions as to statutes being void for 
indefiniteness, I am not sure that that section is specific enough."93 
Given this indeterminacy, it was inevitable that some combination 
of Board and court jurisprudence would put limits on the Board's 
88. RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 202-04 
(1984). 
89. 305 U.S. 197 (1938). Two subsequent cases are more frequently cited for the 
proposition, but one of them relies on Consolidated Edison, while the other merely applies 
the principle without stating it or providing any authority or reasoning. Phelps Dodge Corp. 
v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197-98 (1941); Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 9-12 
(1940). 
90. Consol. Edison, 305 U.S. at 236 (emphasis added). 
91. Id. at 235-36. 
92. National Labor Relations Act § lO(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2000). 
93. Hearings on S. 1958 Before the S. Comm. On Educ. and Labor, 74th Cong. 448 
(1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 35, at 1617, 1834 (testimony of 
Robert T. Caldwell). This was the only on-point remark about the breadth of the Board's 
remedial powers in the legislative history compiled by the Board, perhaps because the Act's 
opponents put their main emphasis on attacking the procedure. 
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discretion; the question was what the limits would be. However, the 
Court's choice to draw the line so as to prohibit any consideration of 
deterrence conflicted with the statutory command to order action that 
would "effectuate the policies of this Act," all of which required the 
deterrence of unfair labor practices and not merely their remediation. 
The Act proceeded from the theory that unfair labor practices 
triggered strikes, and strikes burdened commerce.94 Accordingly, 
section 1 of the Act clearly set forth both ex ante deterrent and ex post 
remedial policies, with ex ante deterrence coming first: 
It is declared hereby to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the 
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce 
and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have 
occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective 
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of 
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their 
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of 
their employment or other mutual aid or protection.95 
Why, then, did the Court confine the Board to ex post remedial 
objectives only? To answer this question, it will be necessary to 
consider the factual context of the Court's holding in Consolidated 
Edison. The Board had voided a number of collective bargaining 
agreements between the Consolidated Edison Company and locals of 
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), an 
affiliate of the American Federation of Labor.96 The agreements had 
been negotiated in the midst of an organizing effort by the United 
Electrical Workers (UE), a CIO affiliate with a reputation for 
militancy.97 The Board found that the company had discriminated 
against the UE and in favor of the IBEW.98 According to the Board, 
the company had discharged six UE activists, had engaged in 
industrial espionage against the UE, and had provided material 
assistance to the IBEW, including allowing its representatives to 
conduct business on company property during working hours. In the 
94. See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 ("The denial by employers of 
the right of employees to organize and the refusal by employers to accept the procedure of 
collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have 
the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce . . . .  ") . 
95. Id. (emphasis added). 
96. Consol. Edison Co., 305 U.S. at 218. For a more thorough discussion of the factual 
background of the case plus a revealing analysis of the AFL's position, see CHRISTOPHER L. 
TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED 
LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960, at 169-76 (1985). 
97. Consol. Edison Co., 305 U.S. at 217-18. On the militancy of the UE, see generally 
RONALD L. FILIPPELLI & MARK MCCOLLOCH, COLD WAR IN THE WORKING CLASS: THE 
RISE AND DECLINE OF THE UNITED ELECTRICAL WORKERS (1995); RONALD W. SCHATZ, 
THE ELECTRICAL WORKERS: A HISTORY OF LABOR AT GENERAL ELECTRIC AND 
WESTINGHOUSE, 1923-60 (1983). 
98. Consol. Edison Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 71, 94-95, 107-08 (1937). 
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midst of these violations, the company recognized the IBEW locals as 
the representatives for their members and commenced collective 
bargaining. Within two months, the company had concluded 
agreements with the IBEW locals, and those locals - which had 
enrolled almost no members as of the grant of recognition - had 
signed up 30,000 of the company's 38,000 employees. The Board found 
that although the grant of recognition and the collective bargaining 
agreement purported to cover IBEW members only, the company's 
policy had been to negotiate with no other union and to extend the 
collective bargaining agreements to all employees.99 Hence, the 
contracts interfered with the workers' free choice of representatives 
and had to be dissolved. 
The Court disapproved this order for two reasons, both of which 
flowed from constitutional concerns. First, the order conflicted with 
the Court's view of how best to fulfill the constitutionally required 
function of facilitating interstate commerce. As in Fansteel and 
Mackay, the Board's decision had stressed this goal to the exclusion of 
all others. It described in terrifying detail the "disastrous effect" that a 
strike against such a large provider of electric and gas power would 
inflict on interstate commerce.100 The Supreme Court heartily shared 
this concern, but found the Board's solution perverse. Taking the 
situation after the employer's violations as a given, Chief Justice 
Hughes argued that because the IBEW contracts prohibited strikes 
and provided for the arbitration of disputes, they were "highly 
protective to interstate and foreign commerce." Voiding such 
contracts, "even pending proceedings to ascertain by an election the 
wishes of the majority of employees, would remove that salutary 
protection during the intervening period." Thus, the contracts did not 
"affect commerce" in a way that would justify their abrogation.101 
To the Court, then, the statutory policy in favor of "full freedom of 
association, self-organization and designation of representatives" was 
contingent on a case-by-case judicial determination as to whether 
vindicating those freedoms would facilitate interstate commerce. The 
employer won in court because its admittedly illegal discrimination 
was effective on the ground. Once eighty percent of the workers 
acquiesced in the employer's choice of union, it became highly 
unlikely that the violations would provoke a strike or otherwise 
disrupt commerce. Since Consolidated Edison's illegal discrimination 
had already worked to promote the "fundamental" purpose of 
protecting commerce,102 it would be silly to insist that peace be 
99. Id. at 93. 
100. Id. at 79. 
101. Consol. Edison Co., 305 U.S. at 237. 
102 Id. 
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achieved - if at all - through the exercise of worker freedom. 
Second, the Court was concerned about the Board order's 
intrusion on the parties' liberty of contract. The IBEW's lawyers had 
argued that by "absolutely and utterly" destroying "existing contracts 
of labor organizations of long established standing," the Board had 
unconstitutionally taken the union's property and impaired the 
obligation of contracts in violation of the Fifth Amendment.103 They 
further urged the Court to apply a clear statement rule that " [p]ower 
over and affecting the life, liberty, property and security of the citizen 
may not be taken by inference, but only when the statute under which 
it is claimed demonstrates a plain intent to grant it."104 Chief Justice 
Hughes duly prefaced his analysis of the Board's statutory power to 
order "affirmative action" by noting that "the Act gives no express 
authority to the Board to invalidate contracts with independent labor 
organizations."105 He then proceeded to hold that the IBEW's 
members "had the right to choose the Brotherhood as their 
representative for collective bargaining and to have contracts made as 
the result of that bargaining" and that the employer's unfair labor 
practices had not "deprived them of that right."106 Hughes purported 
to derive this right from the statute but, as Christopher Tomlins has 
pointed out, the ruling "was an important affirmation of the 
supremacy of the common law of contract."107 To Hughes, the 
employer's suppression of the UE and support for the IBEW could 
not justify abrogating the IBEW contracts as long as that union had 
any members "who joined voluntarily."108 The contract rights of those 
members and their union thus trumped the statutory right of the 
majority of workers to select "representatives of their own choosing." 
In dissent, Justice Reed argued that the Board must be empowered 
to "nullify advantages" that the employer had gained by favoring the 
IBEW - a purpose that sounded more in deterrence than in 
remedy.109 To hold otherwise would be "to withdraw from the Board 
the specific authority granted by the Act to take affirmative action to 
protect the workers' right of self-organization." Where the Board had 
stressed solely the statutory purpose of protecting commerce, Reed 
tried to build up the purpose of worker freedom. He agreed with Chief 
Justice Hughes that the "fundamental purpose" of the Act was to 
103. Brief for Petitioners International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers et al. at 46-
49, Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938) (No. 25). 
104. Id. at 44. 
105. Consol. Edison Co., 305 U.S. at 235. 
106. Id. at 236. 
107. TOMLINS, supra note 96, at 172 n.78. 
108. Consol. Edison Co., 305 U.S. at 238. 
109. Id. at 245 (Reed, J., joined by Black, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
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protect commerce, and that this purpose was to be accomplished 
through collectively bargained contracts. But to Reed, the statute 
contemplated only contracts that had been negotiated by unions 
"created through the self-organization of workers, free from 
interference, restraint or coercion of the employer." The right of self­
organization was "the basic privilege guaranteed by the Act,'' and 
"[f]reedom from employer domination flows from freedom in self­
organization. "110 
Reed's treatment of the statutory purposes undoubtedly tracked 
the intentions of the Act's framers. They had elevated the commerce­
protecting purpose over all others not because they believed it was 
more important, but because it was the centerpiece of their 
constitutional strategy.1 11 However, once this purpose was given 
priority in the statutory text, the Court could scarcely be blamed for 
taking the framers at their word. Its twofold transgression lay, instead, 
first in valuing the common law contract rights of the employer and 
the IBEW over the statutory right of the employees to select their 
bargaining representative, and second, in substituting its own, ex post 
facto view of how to facilitate commerce in place of the statute's ex 
ante goal of eliminating the causes of industrial disputes. In the years 
following Consolidated Edison, the Court's specific holding on the 
abrogation of contracts has been narrowed, 1 12 but its general 
prohibition against the deterrence of unfair labor practices lives on. 
IV. How UNION ORGANIZERS BECAME TRESPASSERS 
Under the NLRA, the preferred method for establishing collective 
bargaining is the union representation election. To most Americans, 
the word "election" connotes a political contest between two parties 
of equal legal status. The party currently in office is prohibited from 
using the power of government against the opposition party. But 
union representation campaigns are conducted on turf controlled by 
one of the competing parties, namely the employer. Current law 
allows employers to use this control to gain advantages unheard of in 
political elections. The employer may command voters to attend anti­
union rallies on pain of discharge. It may require voters to meet one­
on-one with their supervisors to hear anti-union messages. And it may 
adopt and enforce a rule prohibiting everyone but itself from 
110. Id. 
111. See Pope, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 34, at 47-50. 
112. See Milk & Ice Cream Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 98 v. McCulloch, 306 F.2d 
763, 765-66 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (enforcing NLRB order abrogating contract between employer 
and bona fide union, partly on the ground that " [c]ollective bargaining agreements, 
conducive to industrial peace and stability, are of course encouraged; but the Act 
contemplates that they shall be between management on the one hand and the freely chosen 
representative of the employees on the other"). 
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campaigning during work time.113 Though daunting, these advantages 
could be at least partly offset if union organizers could enter the 
workplace to respond. But except in exceedingly rare circumstances, 
employers also enjoy the right to exclude organizers from their 
property. 
In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court set forth the rule 
that section 7 leaves intact the employer's property right to exclude 
"nonemployee" union organizers from company property "except in 
the rare case where 'the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective 
the reasonable attempts by nonemployees to communicate with them 
through the usual channels."'114 The Board is "not permitted" to 
balance the employees' statutory interest in receiving information 
against the employer's "right to control the use of his property. "115 
Instead, the employer's property rights automatically prevail unless 
"unique obstacles" prevent communication, as in remote logging 
camps, mining camps, and mountain resort hotels, where the 
employees both live and work on the employer's premises.116 The 
employer need not plead any business interest to justify excluding 
organizers and may, in fact, restrict access for the precise purpose of 
preventing communication from reaching its employees.117 Because 
employees typically scatter after work, the Lechmere rule poses a 
serious obstacle to organizing.118 Coupled with the rules permitting 
1 13. See GETMAN ET AL., supra note 52, at 51-52; HUMAN RIGHfS WATCH, UNFAIR 
ADVANTAGE: WORKERS' FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHfS STANDARDS 19-22 (2000); Craig Becker, Democracy in 
the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 
495, 557-60, 564-65 (1993). 
1 14. 502 U.S. 527, 537 (1992) (quoting NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 
1 1 3  (1956)) (emphasis added). 
115. Id. at 537. 
1 16. Id. at 539, 541. 
117. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 305, 325 (1994) [hereinafter Estlund, Lechmere]. 
1 1 8. See James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 
74 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1577-78 (1996) (observing that the "shift to more anonymous 
suburban residential patterns meant that increasingly dispersed employee populations were 
less accessible to reasonable efforts at off-site communication," and pointing out that the 
"usual channels for such communication - mail, telephone, home visits - also were less 
likely to be effective because of people's fatigued response to the impersonal tactics of the 
"solicitation industry"). The facts of Lechmere illustrate the problem. Despite the union's 
good fortune in obtaining cooperation from the Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles 
in attaching names to employees' license plates, it was able to contact directly only 20 
percent of the employees. In the Court's view, the section 7 right of the remaining 80 percent 
to receive information about self-organization was satisfied as long as union organizers could 
hold up placards along the public roadway. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 540. The Court has since 
mitigated the effects of Lechmere for some unions by upholding the NLRB's ruling that a 
paid union organizer who seeks employment at a company in order to organize its 
employees is a statutory "employee" protected against discrimination in hiring and firing. 
NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 98 (1995). Departing sharply from its 
approach in Lechmere, the Town & Country Court went straight to the statutory definition, 
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employers to stage captive audience speeches and to campaign on 
working time while barring workers from doing the same, it puts 
unions at a gross disadvantage in communicating with voters. 
In contrast to Mackay and Consolidated Edison, the Lechmere 
opinion does cite authority and provide reasoning in support of its 
rule. At issue was the validity of the Board's standard requiring 
employers to grant access to union organizers in certain circum­
stances.119 Under the rule of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.,120 the Board's standard was entitled to broad 
deference unless the Court could find contrary "clear meaning" in the 
statute.121 Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas found that "clear 
meaning" in section 7 of the Act, which guarantees the right of self­
organization only to "employees."122 He pointed to the "critical 
distinction between the organizing activities of employees (to whom 
section 7 guarantees the right of self-organization) and nonemployees 
(to whom section 7 applies only derivatively)."123 By itself, this left 
open the question why union organizers, who are "employees" of the 
union and who are aligned with other employees in collective 
bargaining, are not "employees" under section 7. The obvious place to 
look for an answer to this question would be the statutory definition of 
the term "employee," which is contained in section 2(3) of the Act. 
But Justice Thomas chose to conduct his search for the statute's 
"clear meaning" without so much as a glance at the relevant portion of 
the statute itself. Why this omission? Section 2(3) states that "[t]he 
term 'employee' . . .  shall not include . . .  any individual employed . . .  
by any . . .  person who is not an employer as herein defined."124 Justice 
Thomas could have argued that full-time union organizers are 
excluded from this definition because they are employed by labor 
organizations, which are not statutory employers except when they are 
"acting as" employers.125 In the union-organizing setting, the union is 
giving its broad language full effect. Id. at 89-93. The unanimity of the Town & Country 
opinion suggests that it might have been a "make-up call" for the heavily criticized Lechmere 
decision. 
119. The Board's standard was announced in Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11, 16-19 
(1988). 
120. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
121. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 536-37. 
122. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000); Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 
537 ("By reversing the Board's interpretation of the statute for failing to distinguish between 
the organizing activities of employees and nonemployees, we were saying, in Chevron terms, 
that § 7 speaks to the issue of nonemployee access to an employer's property."). 
123. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 533. 
124. National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2002). 
125. National Labor Relations Act § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2002) ("The term 
'employer' . . .  shall not include . . .  any labor organization (other than when acting as an 
employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization."). 
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certainly not acting as an employer. However, there is legislative 
history that weakens this argument. Philip Levy, one of the statute's 
drafters, proposed language specifying that union organizers are 
statutory "employees," but it was not included "apparently because it 
was thought not to be necessary."126 Why would Levy's language be 
unnecessary? Perhaps because it was clear to all concerned that the 
partial exclusion of labor organizations from the definition of 
"employer" provided no reason at all to hold that union organizers -
who are clearly statutory employees in relation to their own employers 
- should lose that status when performing their function of 
organizing workers. Labor organizations were partially excluded from 
the definition of "employer" so that they could not be charged with 
employer unfair labor practices under then-section 8(3), now section 
(8)(a)(3). "Otherwise the provisions of the bill which prevent 
employers from participating in the organizational activities of 
workers would extend to labor unions as well, and thus would deprive 
unions of one of their normal functions. "127 In other words, labor 
organizations were excluded from the definition of "employer" 
precisely so that they could participate in organizing. In light of this 
purpose, it would be ironic indeed to seize on the definition of 
"employer" to prevent union organizers from "participating in the 
organizational activities of workers." 
Whatever the reason, Justice Thomas chose to rely not on the 
statute, but on the Court's pre-Chevron decision in NLRB v. Babcock 
and Wilcox Co. 128 In Babcock, the Court had overturned a series of 
Board orders requiring employers to permit union organizers on their 
property. The Board had erred, the Court held, by "fail[ing] to make a 
distinction between rules of law applicable to employees and those 
applicable to nonemployees."129 Unfortunately for Justice Thomas' 
rationale, however, the terms "nonemployee" and "employee" as used 
by the Babcock Court had nothing whatever to do with the statutory 
term "employees" contained in section 7, and thus could not meet the 
Chevron requirement of "clear meaning" in the statute.130 As of 1956, 
126. ARCHIBALD Cox ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 134 (13th ed. 
2001) (citing Memorandum from Philip Levy, to Calvert Magruder (Apr. 17, 1935)). 
127. S. REP. No. 74-573, at 6 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 
35, at 2300, 2305. 
128. 351 U.S. 105 (1956). 
129. Id. at 113. 
130. By relying on a pre-Chevron decision, the Lechmere court effectively 
grandfathered in the Babcock Court's nondeferential approach. Cf Estlund, Ossification, 
supra note 55, at 1598-99 (suggesting "a kind of retroactive application of Chevron, through 
which the Board would be able to revisit old judicial resolutions of textual ambiguities that, 
in a Chevron world, would have been left to the agency," and pointing out that, "under the 
proposed approach, Lechmere, in which the Board had sought to revise that resolution, 
should have come out differently"). 
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when Babcock was decided, the terms "nonemployee" and 
"employee" had an established usage in cases involving union 
organizer access to employer property. Courts used the term 
"nonemployee" in contradistinction not to a statutory "employee" 
entitled to section 7 rights, but to an employee who was employed by 
the particular employer and therefore rightfully on the property.131 Not 
only was this usage developed without any reference to the statutory 
term "employee," but it directly conflicted with the statutory 
definition. "The term 'employee,"' declares the statute, "shall not be 
limited to the employees of a particular employer."132 But if the statute 
did not distinguish between employees and nonemployees of a 
particular employer, the common law of trespass did. As the Board 
read Babcock, the distinction hinged on the fact "that the 
nonemployees in Babcock & Wilcox sought to trespass on the 
employer's property, whereas the employees" did not.133 Accordingly, 
the Board held that employers enjoyed the property right under 
Babcock to exclude even their own off-duty employees - clearly 
statutory employees entitled to section 7 rights - without pleading 
any business reason.134 In short, Babcock's distinction between 
nonemployees and employees rested not on the statute but on the 
common law of trespass, raising once again the question of how state 
common law rights could trump federal statutory rights.135 
Unlike the opinions in Mackay and Consolidated Edison, the 
Babcock opinion addressed this issue directly. "Organization rights 
are granted to workers, by the same authority, the National 
Government, that preserves property rights," declared the Court. 
"Accommodation between the two must be obtained with as little 
destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the 
131. See, e.g., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 222 F.2d 316, 318 (5th Cir. 1955), gaffs 
351 U.S. 105 (1956) (distinguishing "non-employee organizers" from "union organizers who 
were employees of each company respectively" and contrasting "employee and non­
employee union members"). 
132. National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000). This language was 
inserted precisely to counter the persistent tendency of courts to limit the class of workers 
entitled to rights. See ATLESON, supra note 1, at 62; Estlund, Lechmere, supra note 117, at 
329. 
133. See, e.g., Schwab Foods, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1076 (1987) (quoting Eastex, Inc. 
v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 571 (1978)). 
134. GTE Lenkurt, Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 921 (1973). The employer's right to exclude off­
duty employees has since been qualified. See Tri-County Medical Center, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 
1089, 1089 (1976) (announcing that an employer rule barring off-duty employees is valid "if 
it (1) limits access solely with respect to the interior of the plant and other working areas; (2) 
is clearly disseminated to all employees; and (3) applies to off-duty employees seeking access 
to the plant for any purpose and not just to those employees engaging in union activity"). 
135. Despite Justice Thomas's reference to the term "employees" in section 7, 
Lechmere, like Babcock & Wilcox before it, has been read not as incorporating the statutory 
definition of employee, but the common law distinction between trespassers and invitees. 
See Estlund, Lechmere, supra note 117, at 324-25. 
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other."136 Of course, as any first-year law student can testify, property 
rights are creatures of state law, not the "National Government." 
National involvement in property law can, however, be found in the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 
which prohibit national and state government from depriving a person 
of property without due process of law or from taking property 
"without just compensation."137 This was the approach urged by the 
company's lawyers,138 and it is the only apparent explanation of the 
Babcock Court's reference to the "National Government," which, in 
turn, is the only rationale for the rule of Lechmere. 
Commenting on Babcock, James Atleson remarked that, in light of 
the opinion's failure to cite the statutory definition of "employee," the 
Supreme Court evidently "feels free to apply common-law property 
notions without any felt need to respond to either the language of the 
act or its history."139 That the Lechmere Court subsequently managed 
to find "clear meaning" in the statute sufficient to evade Chevron -
still without once citing the governing statutory definition - attests to 
the arrogance of this judicial liberty. Aside from the reference to the 
national government in Babcock, and an occasional explicit invocation 
of the Constitution by dissenting Justices or lower courts,140 judges 
have left the trumping power of property rights unexplained and 
unexamined. 
v. How EMPLOYERS WON THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO CLASS 
SOLIDARITY 
Class solidarity has not fared well in American courts. Under the 
common law, judges held that strikes were lawful only if the strikers 
were motivated by the prospect of immediate economic gain for 
themselves; broader or more attenuated motives were condemned as 
"malicious."141 When statutes began to displace the common law, 
courts carried this approach over into their statutory interpretations. 
Absent a strong showing of immediate worker self-interest, collective 
action falls outside the NLRA's protection for concerted activities for 
136. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956). 
137. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
138. Brief for Respondent, at 17, NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956) 
(No. 250). 
139. ATLESON, supra note 1, at 62. 
140. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 580 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., with Burger, 
C.J., dissenting) (quoted supra, text accompanying note 9); NLRB v. Windemuller Electric, 
Inc., 34 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1994). 
141. See Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011, 1013 (Mass. 1900); TOMLINS, supra note 96, at 44. 
On the use of the term "malice" to describe forbidden objectives, see Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1894). 
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mutual aid or protection.142 Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
construed the Act's secondary boycott ban broadly to include political 
boycotts on the ground that it is "more rather than less objectionable" 
for a union to pursue non-traditional objectives instead of higher 
wages and better working conditions for its own members.143 
But in Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co., the 
Court carved out a limited but increasingly important exception for 
employer class solidarity.144 Reversing its usual preference for 
narrowly self-interested activity, the Court ruled that an employer 
may close a facility to punish its employees for choosing union 
representation provided that the employer is not motivated by 
economic self-interest.145 Management had threatened to close a 
textile mill that was the economic mainstay of a small southern town if 
the workers voted to be represented by the Textile Workers Union.146 
Nevertheless, the union won the election by a small margin. Six days 
later, the company's board of directors voted to close the plant and 
terminate all 500 employees.147 Supervisors forthrightly told the 
workers that the shutdown was because of the union vote, and that the 
workers would be blacklisted in their search for jobs.148 Eighty-three 
percent of the workers then signed a petition renouncing the union, 
but the top management official declared that "[a]s long as there are 
seventeen percent of the hard core crowd here, I refuse to run the 
mill. ,,149 
Section 8(a)(l) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for 
an employer to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the 
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." It is difficult to imagine 
a more dramatic and effective means of coercing employees than to 
punish them by closing their workplace altogether. The facts of 
Darlington provide a graphic illustration. Within weeks of the closing, 
a majority of the union voters had renounced their support for the 
union in a desperate attempt to recover their jobs.150 The Board found 
142. Richard Michael Fischl, Self, Others, and Section 7: Mutualism and Protected 
Protest Activities Under the National Labor Relations Act, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 789, 793-814, 
864 (1989); ATLESON, supra note 1, at 10. 
143. Int'! Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'!, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 225-26 (1982) 
(quoting the lower court's opinion, Allied Int'!, Inc. v. Int'! Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 
1368, 1378 (1st Cir. 1981)); see also Alan Hyde, Economic Labor Law v. Political Labor 
Relations: Dilemmas for Liberal Legalism, 60 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1981) (analyzing and 
critiquing the distinction between political and economic activity by unions). 
144. 380 U.S. 263 (1965). 
145. Id. at 272. 
146. Id. at 265. 
147. Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 243 (1962). 
148. Id. at 244 n.10, 279, 281-82. 
149. Id. at 244. 
150. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
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unfair labor practices and ordered that the employees be made whole 
for wages lost from the time of the closing until they found 
substantially equivalent employment.151 
But the Supreme Court announced a new rule that "some 
employer decisions are so peculiarly matters of management 
prerogative" they cannot violate section 8(a)(l) no matter how great 
their impact on section 7 rights, unless they also violate section 
8(a)(3), which requires a showing of anti-union discrimination.152 
Furthermore, the Court continued, proof of management's anti-union 
hostility - of which there was plenty in Darlington - is not enough to 
establish discrimination. The employer may intentionally destroy the 
union and punish the workers for exercising their statutory rights 
unless the Board can prove that these actions were undertaken for the 
specific purpose of obtaining future economic benefits from the 
employer's remaining employees.153 Applying these principles, the 
Court held that a corporation has an "absolute right" to terminate its 
employees and go out of business altogether regardless of the impact 
on section 7 rights - there being no remaining employees from whom 
to obtain future benefits.154 Further, a corporation may close a part of 
its business in retaliation for the exercise of section 7 rights unless the 
NLRB can prove that the closing had the purpose of chilling unionism 
among the corporation's remaining employees.155 
Darlington has exerted an increasingly devastating impact on 
unions as technological advances have smoothed the way for 
corporations to move their operations.156 As we have seen, companies 
are permitted to shut down facilities for retaliatory purposes without 
any regard for the rights of employees at the closed facilities; the only 
employees who count are those at the company's other, still-operating 
facilities. But if those operating facilities are not in the United States, 
then their employees are not covered by the Act, and the shutdown 
could not have been for the purpose of chilling their non-existent 
section 7 rights. "By focusing on the chilling effect on any remaining 
domestic employees, instead of on the discrimination practiced against 
those who lost their jobs," observes Terry Collingsworth, "the 
151. Id. at 253-56. 
152. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. at 269. 
153. Id. at 270-72. 
154. Id. at 268. 
155. Id. at 275. This issue arose because the Board had held that the Darlington 
Company was controlled by a parent company, the Deering Milliken Corporation, and that 
Deering-Millikin could be held responsible for Darlington's unfair labor practices. 
Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. at 257-58. 
156. See Abner J. Mikva, The Changing Role of the Wagner Act in the American Labor 
Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1123, 1129 (1986). 
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Court . . .  has immunized multinational runaways."157 
The Darlington Court's failure to consider the coercive impact of 
the closing on the terminated workers and their town has sparked 
vigorous criticism over the years. Clyde Summers set the tone early 
on: 
The essence of the Court's logic is that discharge for supporting the 
union is not itself an unfair labor practice, that it is no wrong as to the 
ones discharged, and that the law is not concerned with their injury. 
Discrimination against them is an evil only when it intimidates others; 
any remedy given them is only to make others feel secure. This is to see 
in the execution of hostages nothing more than an intimidation of the 
living; it is to make murder a crime only when the killer's purpose is to 
instill fear.158 
Why did the Court tum a blind eye to the terminated workers? As 
to Darlington, the Court asserted that "so far as the Labor Relations 
Act is concerned, an employer has the absolute right to terminate his 
entire business for any reason he pleases."159 To explain this assertion, 
the Court contrasted the retaliatory plant closing with the (concededly 
illegal) retaliatory lockout. An employer might use a lockout to win 
economic concessions from workers, but: 
[A] complete liquidation of a business yields no such future benefit for 
the employer, if the termination is bona fide. It may be motivated more 
by spite against the union than by business reasons, but it is not the type 
of discrimination which is prohibited by the Act. The personal 
satisfaction that such an employer may derive from standing on his 
beliefs and the mere possibility that other employers will follow his 
example are surely too remote to be considered dangers at which the 
labor statutes were aimed. Although employees may be prohibited from 
engaging in a strike under certain conditions, no one would consider it a 
violation of the Act for the same employees to quit their employment en 
masse, even if motivated by a desire to ruin the employer. The very 
permanence of such action would negate any future economic benefit to 
the employees. The employer's right to go out of business is no 
different.160 
The Court's attempted analogy between permanent plant closings 
and employees quitting is simply nonsensical. The reason why no one 
157. Terry Collingsworth, Resurrecting the National Labor Relations Act - Plant 
Closings and Runaway Shops in a Global Economy, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 72, 106 
(1993). 
158. Clyde Summers, Labor Law in the Supreme Court: 1964 Term, 75 YALE L.J. 59, 67 
(1965); see also ATLESON, supra note 1, at 141-42; Julius G. Getman, Section 8(a)(3) of the 
NLRA and the Effort to Insulate Free Employee Choice, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 735, 754-55 
(1965) [hereinafter Getman, Section 8(a)(3)]; Robert A. Gorman, The Negligible Impact of 
the National Labor Relations Act on Managerial Decisions to Close or Relocate, 58 TuL. L. 
REV. 1354, 1359 (1984). 
159. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268 (1965). 
160. Id. at 272. 
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would consider it a violation of the Act for employees to quit for the 
purpose of ruining an employer is that the Act does not even purport 
to prohibit employees from doing anything; it prohibits labor 
organizations or their agents from restraining or coercing employers in 
the selection of their representatives for purposes of collective 
bargaining.161 If a union ordered workers to quit permanently in order 
to punish an employer for exercising its freedom to select 
representatives (the appropriate analogy), there is little doubt that the 
Board and the courts would find an unfair labor practice. 
On further examination, the statement only becomes more 
mysterious. As we have seen, courts have long held that strikes 
become more - not less - vulnerable to legal suppression when they 
are motivated by considerations other than economic gain. This 
principle is grounded on the idea that because a strike involves the 
deliberate infliction of economic damage, it is justifiable only if the 
strikers themselves have an observable interest at stake.162 Yet, under 
Darlington, employers enjoy the privilege of dealing catastrophic 
economic damage to entire working class communities not only despite 
their lack of any observable economic interest, but because they have 
no such interest and may - in fact - be "motivated . . . by spite 
against the union." Thus, Darlington stands the old common-law 
malice test exactly on its head: for employers, malicious motivation 
can be a ticket to legal immunity. 
But in fact, of course, there is much more to retaliatory shutdowns 
than mere spite or malice. Like sympathy strikes and secondary 
strikes, they produce valuable benefits - benefits that are reaped not 
directly by the perpetrator, but by fellow members of the perpetrator's 
class. The shutdown operates like a public flogging, intimidating not 
only the victims themselves, but also every worker who hears of their 
plight. Darlington excludes this effect from consideration unless the 
employer stands to gain individually from the intimidation of its own 
remaining employees. Employers that act out of class solidarity, 
helping to produce a cowed and compliant workforce for their fellow 
employers, are privileged to commit what would otherwise be 
statutory violations. 
How, then, can Darlington be explained? Without specifically 
mentioning the Constitution, the Court applied the clear statement 
rule: "A proposition that a single businessman cannot choose to go out 
of business if he wants to would represent such a startling innovation 
that it should not be entertained without the clearest manifestation of 
161. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2000) ("It shall be 
an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents - (1) to restrain or coerce . . .  
(B) an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective 
bargaining . . . .  " (emphasis added)). 
162 See CHARLES 0. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 107-10 (2d rev. ed. 1961). 
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legislative intent or unequivocal judicial precedent so construing the 
Labor Relations Act."163 At the equivalent juncture in the opinion 
below, the Court of Appeals made the constitutional connection 
explicit. "A statute authorizing an order forcing the continued pursuit 
of operations in these circumstances," opined the court, "would be of 
doubtful validity. "164 
The Supreme Court's reference to "a single businessman" 
choosing to go out of business invokes the rights both of property and 
contract. This problem was mentioned on the floor of Congress, where 
proponents of the NLRA assured opponents that the bill would not 
prevent an operator from closing "his" plant.165 Like our other four "of 
course" statements, then, Darlington can be explained as a belated 
echo of Lochner-era economic due process. 
But if the Court was Lochnerizing, it was doing an awfully poor 
job of it. After all, Darlington and Deering-Milliken were both 
corporations - not "single" businessmen. Moreover, the Board did 
not order anyone to remain in business; it required only that the 
corporations compensate employees who were terminated for 
retaliatory reasons. The Supreme Court did not comment on this 
point; it simply assumed that the Board's ruling was equivalent to the 
"proposition that a single businessman cannot choose to go out of 
business if he wants to." But obviously the government can impose 
some burdens on going out of business, for example taxes on the sale 
of assets. It is not at all clear why the employer's liberty interest 
requires not only that it should be allowed to go out of business for 
retaliatory reasons, but also that it be freed from any obligation to 
factor in the cost of compensating terminated employees for the loss 
of their statutory right to organize.166 
How then, do we make sense of Darlington? Is the decision 
"inherently incredible,"167 as an exasperated Clyde Summers 
concluded years ago? Maybe, but there is another possibility. Perhaps 
we could make some sense of Darlington by reading it as a modern 
163. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. at 270. 
164. Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 682, 685 (4th Cir. 1963), vacated by, 380 
U.S. 263 (1965). 
165. 79 CONG. REC. 7673, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 35, at 2394 
(statement of Sen. Walsh) ("[T]here are some fundamental rights an employer has, just as 
there are rights an employee has. No one can compel an employer to keep his factory 
open."); 79 CONG. REC. 9682, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 35, at 3110 
(statement of Rep. Griswold) ("There is nothing in the bill to keep an operator from closing 
his plant. There is nothing in the bill that says you shall reach an agreement - nothing of 
that sort."). 
166. See Getman, Section B(a) (J), supra note 158, at 754 (observing that "the conclusion 
that an employer should not be forced to stay in business against his will does not require the 
further conclusion that his conduct in closing down is outside the scope of the Act"). 
167. Summers, supra note 158, at 67. 
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constitutional decision. In the constitutional law of the post-New Deal 
era, as in Darlington, non-economic motivation weighs in favor of 
legal protection. For example, political speech occupies a higher 
position on the "hierarchy of first amendment values" than 
commercial speech, 168 and politically-motivated boycotts higher than 
economically-motivated boycotts.169 Put this together with the 
established - albeit bitterly criticized - principle that corporations 
are entitled to the same degree of constitutional protection as natural 
persons, and we have a constitutional explanation for Darlington 's 
right of corporations to stand on their beliefs and punish workers for 
unionizing. On this view, the anomaly in the law lies not in Darlington 
itself, but in the Court's failure to apply the same rule to unions that 
refuse to handle goods for solidaristic or political reasons. If non­
economic motivation weighs against the suppression of employer 
conduct, then why should the same motivation make union conduct 
"more rather than less objectionable" and thus subject to greater 
restriction?170 
VI. CONCLUSION: THE PERFECT CRIME 
This Essay has examined five important labor law doctrines that 
were originally announced as "of course" propositions. In each case, 
the proposition in question deployed an employer right grounded in 
state common law as a trump over a labor right grounded in federal 
168. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980); see, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. 
Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 506-09 (1988) (explaining that a corporation's efforts to 
influence a private standard-setting organization were not entitled to full first amendment 
protection because the company was economically motivated); Bolger v. Youngs Drug 
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 (1983) (holding that pamphlets combining product descriptions 
with commentary on the desirability of contraceptives in general were commercial speech in 
part because of the company's "economic motivation" for selling them). 
169. Compare NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-12 (1982) (holding 
that a "politically motivated" civil rights boycott was protected under the First 
Amendment), with Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 
427 (1990) (holding that a boycott by court-appointed defense lawyers could be 
constitutionally prohibited in part because the lawyers' "immediate objective was to increase 
the price that they would be paid for their services"). 
170. Int'! Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'!, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 225-26 (1982). For 
criticism of the Court's treatment of political and solidaristic labor protest, see ATLESON, 
supra note 1, at 68-74; Fischl, supra note 142, at 865; Julius Getman, Labor Law and Free 
Speech: The Curious Policy of Limited Expression, 43 MD. L. REV. 4, 17-18 (1984); Hyde, 
supra note 143; Thomas C. Kohler, Setting the Conditions for Self-Rule: Unions, Associations, 
our First Amendment Discourse and the Problem ofDeBarto1o, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 149, 168-
70 (1990); Gary Minda, The Law and Metaphor of Boycott, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 807, 826-30 
(1993); James G. Pope, The Three-Systems Ladder of First Amendment Values: Two Rungs 
and a Black Hole, 1 1  HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189, 189-91, 225-27 (1984); see also Seth 
Kupferberg, Political Strikes, Labor Law, and Democratic Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 685 (1985) 
(presenting a carefully crafted effort to rationalize and harmonize the leading cases in a way 
that would provide a far greater degree of protection for political protest by labor than has 
been implemented either by courts or the Board). 
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statutory law - thus reversing the normal hierarchy of laws. And in 
each case, it turned out that what the Supreme Court treated as a 
matter "of course," had been justified by lawyers and lower court 
judges in constitutional terms. State common law rights of property 
and contract were elevated above federal statutory rights of self­
organization and collective action through Lochner-era notions of 
economic due process and interstate commerce. 
This summary leaves us with some important questions. First, if 
these decisions are best explained in terms of constitutional law, then 
why didn't the Supreme Court just come out and say so? The answer 
may be found in the Court's experience with its Fansteel opinion, the 
only one of the five to mention the Constitution directly. Although the 
opinion as a whole drew mixed reactions, the constitutional language 
in particular drew harsh criticism. Professor J. Denson Smith charged 
that Fansteel had revived the discredited economic due process 
decisions of Coppage v. Kansas and Adair v. United States.111 Once 
again, he explained, the due process clause had been applied to the 
employer-employee relationship so as "to protect the general control 
of the former over the latter," and this time "even during a period of 
industrial strife, and notwithstanding that the employer had been 
guilty of unfair labor practices under the Act."172 Others agreed.173 On 
the assumption that Fansteel partook of the pre-New Deal mentality, 
New York Times columnist Arthur Krock predicted that the 
dissenters' position - which was "eloquent of New Deal reasoning" in 
emphasizing the Board's statutory power to remedy unfair labor 
practices - would eventually prevail.174 The reaction to Fansteel's 
constitutional language signaled that if the Court were to persist in 
openly resurrecting economic due process in labor law, it would do so 
at a heavy cost in legitimacy. 
So the Justices hid the economic due process in "of course" 
statements. And, just as importantly, they pushed it away from what 
were then the central issues and to the margins - out of the political 
and professional spotlights.175 Many of the "of course" statements 
171. J. Denson Smith, Comment, From Nose-Thumbing to Sabotage: The Fansteel Sit­
Down Decision, 1 LA. L. REV. 577, 577 (1939). 
172 Id. at 580. 
173. See, e.g. , Frank Thomas Miller, Jr., Comment, Labor Law - Sit-Down Strikes -
Reinstatement of Employees Under the Wagner Act, 17 N.C. L. REV. 438, 439 (1939); Recent 
Decision, Labor Law: Power of the National Labor Relations Board to Order Reinstatement 
of Sit-Down Strikers, 27 CAL. L. REV. 470, 472-73 (1939). 
174. Arthur Krock, Implications in the dissents of Reed and Black, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 
1939, at 20. 
175. This phenomenon followed the pattern modeled by Jack Balkin as "the crystalline 
structure of law." Balkin shows how a dominant principle may triumph over a competing 
counterprinciple in a central case, yet remain vulnerable to the suppressed counter-principle 
in more marginal cases. J.M. Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1986). 
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were barely noticed at the time. It is only over the past several 
decades, as their impact has been magnified by social and economic 
change, that they have emerged as central issues. Taken together, they 
may account for a substantial proportion of the decline in the 
American labor movement. The permanent replacement rule of 
Mackay, ignored at the time and rarely utilized until the 1980s, now 
operates to prevent workers from exercising their right to strike for 
better conditions.176 The no-deterrence rule of Consolidated Edison, 
also little noted at the time, now ensures that even when employers 
are caught red-handed, they stand to gain financially from violating 
workers' rights. 177 The employer's right to exclude union organizers 
under Babcock & Wilcox and Lechmere poses an increasingly 
formidable barrier to union-worker communication as more and more 
jobs are located in self-contained facilities like malls, shopping centers, 
industrial parks and office parks.178 Finally, the employer's right -
announced in Darlington - to punish workers for unionizing by 
closing their place of employment out of "spite," which was 
considered at the time unlikely to be exercised very often, now causes 
serious problems due to the increasingly global scope of economic 
activity.179 
This brings us to the question of legitimacy. Had the Court openly 
grounded these rulings in the Constitution, it is highly unlikely that 
they would remain good law today. For half a century, the Court has 
disavowed economic due process. Despite academic efforts to revive 
Lochner, the decision continues to operate as a negative precedent, 
176. Befort, supra note 56, at 440-41 (recounting that employers did not begin to make 
extensive use of the permanent replacement rule until after 1981, when President Ronald 
Reagan used the tactic to defeat the air traffic controllers' strike). On the recent impact of 
Mackay, see supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. At the time of the decision, unionists 
and their legal allies focused on the positive aspects of the case, not even bothering to 
mention the permanent replacement issue. See, e.g., Supreme Court's O.K. Of NLRB In 
Mackay Case Blow To Tories, UNION NEWS SERVICE: COMMITTEE FOR INDUS. ORG., May 
20, 1938, at 1 .  
177. On the impact of the no-deterrence rule today, see supra notes 85-88 and 
accompanying text. Like Mackay, Consolidated Edison raised a number of issues, and the 
Board prevailed on all except one. For contemporary reports, see, for example, Ward P. 
Allen, Recent Decisions, Labor Law - Power of National Labor Relations Board to 
Invalidate Contract Between Employer and Bona Fide Union, 37 MICH. L. REV. 660, 663 
(1939), and Recent Cases, Labor Law - National Labor Relations Act - Abrogation of 
Contracts Signed During Pendency of NLRB Proceedings, 52 HARV. L. REV. 695, 695-96 
(1939). 
178. On the impact of Babcock & Wilcox and Lechmere, see supra note 118 and 
accompanying text. 
179. On the effects of Darlington today, see supra notes 156-157 and accompanying text. 
While the Darlington decision was heavily criticized at the time, nobody contested the 
Supreme Court's view that there was nothing more than a "mere possibility" that other 
employers would follow Darlington's lead. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 
380 U.S. 263, 272 (1965). 
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and the charge of Lochnerizing rarely fails to elicit strong denials.180 
But by couching its rulings as matters of statutory construction, the 
Court has entrenched them against change. As Cynthia Estlund 
recently observed, labor law has ossified. No matter how devoid of 
statutory reasoning or how destructive of the statute's purposes in 
light of changed conditions, old Supreme Court constructions of the 
statute are accorded a kind of super-stare decisis.181 Not only are the 
corpses in labor law buried in "of course" statements, then, but they 
are buried deeply, beyond the reach of judicial or administrative 
change. Through misdirection, the Court has pulled off the perfect 
crime. 
180. On the continuing vitality of Lochner as a negative precedent, see, for example, 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 605 (1995) (Thomas, J. concurring) (denying that the 
majority was reviving Lochner), and College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666, 690-691 (1999) (same). On the failure of efforts to 
rehabilitate Lochner, see Gary D. Rowe, Lochner Revisionism Revisited, 24 LAW & Soc. 
INQUIRY 221, 222, 243 (1999). 
181. See Estlund, Ossification, supra note 55, at 1561. 
